negotiators was one of the key achievements of the Uruguay Round, and a very significant step in the evolution of international economic law. But after six years of experience, WTO observers are beginning to consider whether recourse to damaging trade measures was a good idea. 1 This article provides an analytical framework for rethinking WTO trade sanctions.
To be sure, the WTO Agreement does not employ the word "sanction." What the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) of 1994 says in Article 22 is that if a government fails to bring a measure found to be inconsistent with a WTO rule into compliance, it shall enter into negotiations with the government invoking dispute settlement, and if no mutually acceptable compensation is agreed, the plaintiff government may seek authorization from the WTO Dispute Settlement Body give a ruling in a complaint regarding the failure of a party to carry out its obligations. If the Contracting Parties "consider that the circumstances are serious enough to justify such action, they may authorize a contracting party or parties to suspend the application to any other contracting party or parties of such concessions or other obligations as they determine to be appropriate in the circumstances." 3 Yet even without using the S-word, the WTO utilizes a sanction. As will be shown in this article, the purpose of the WTO action is to induce compliance, and that is properly called a "sanction." With the advent of the WTO, the trade policy community has recognized that the WTO system is different than the GATT system, and has increasingly employed the term "sanction" to describe what DSU Article 22 authorizes. The old GATT idea of suspending concessions has metamorphosed in the WTO into a trade sanction.
Authorizations for WTO sanctions do not occur often. Out of the 37 disputes in which a defendant government was judged in violation, only two have led to trade sanctions. 4 The two cases involved the European Communities (EC) as the defendant --the Bananas and meat
Hormones disputes. In December 2000, the DSB authorized Canada to impose trade sanctions against Brazil in the Aircraft dispute, but Canada has not yet done so. 5 The refusal of the EC to comply after being sanctioned has led to two critical perspectives on the DSU. One camp says that the sanctions failed because the teeth are not sharp enough. In A less critical, and probably majority, perspective is that it is too soon to judge the merits of WTO sanctions. The Bananas and Hormones episodes are far from over. 7 Moreover, in some cases, such as Australia Salmon, the threat of WTO-authorized sanctions was probably instrumental in securing compliance by the defendant government. 8 While it may be too soon to issue a conclusive judgment, it is not too soon to begin an assessment of the experience of WTO sanctions. Such an assessment should consider the impact of sanctions for achieving compliance with WTO rules. Yet it should also go beyond that to consider how such "hard" enforcement affects public opinion about the WTO and trade itself.
Without trade sanctions, surely no one would call the WTO the "World Takeover Organization,"
as some protestors did at the Seattle Ministerial Conference. A comprehensive assessment should also consider the impact of WTO sanctions on other international treaty systems that may want to emulate the WTO in employing trade sanctions.
This article attempts a preliminary assessment along these lines. It proceeds in four parts.
Part I discusses the role of trade sanctions in the trade regime, emphasizing the difference between compensation that restores a previously balanced exchange and purposive trade measures to induce compliance. Part II lays out the advantages and disadvantages of the current use of trade sanctions in WTO dispute settlement. Part III explores alternatives to trade sanctions, including
"softer" measures that may one day replace trade sanctions. Part IV makes recommendations and concludes.
I. Role of Trade Sanctions in the Trade Regime
This Part provides a brief history of the sanctioning idea and discusses the provisions in the GATT and the WTO. My thesis is that the GATT concept of rebalancing concessions was transmogrified by the WTO into a trade sanction. It is true, of course, that the drafters of GATT in 1947 recognized the sanction-like quality of GATT-authorized trade retorsion. But the sanction paradigm was resisted during the GATT years. Only after the WTO began to operate did it become routine to refer to WTO-authorized trade measures as a "sanction."
Background
The idea of retaliation is an old one. The most famous command was given by the God of the Old Testament: "If anyone injures his neighbor, whatever he has done must be done to him:
fracture for fracture, eye for eye, tooth for tooth." 9 This sentiment has continuing appeal to human emotion, but is not a general principle of law.
Trade retaliation goes back many centuries, and became part of U.S. law in the Antidumping Act of 1916. This provision, still in force, provides that "Whenever any country … No general multilateral trade treaty included dispute settlement backed by trade enforcement until the advent of the GATT. 21 But in the first half of the 20 th century, some multilateral commodity treaties did so. For example, the Sugar Agreement of 1937 provided that the Sugar Council could hear complaints about a party's failure to comply, and recommend measures to other parties "in view of the infringement." 22 If the Council decided that other parties should prohibit the importation of sugar from the infringing country, the Agreement provided that this "shall not be deemed to be contrary to any most-favoured-nation rights which the offending Government may enjoy." 23 In the decades since the founding of the GATT, dozens of regional trade agreements have established dispute mechanisms. 24 Many of these agreements provide for trade remedies analogous to GATT Article XXIII. 25 Only a small part of this experience is addressed here.
Although the League of Nations could authorize economic sanctions against countries that resorted to war, and although the United Nations Security Council can call for economic sanctions against a country guilty of a breach of peace, such sanctions were imposed only three times between 1920 and 1990. 26 Since then, however, economic sanctions have been used frequently. 27 It is possible for the Security Council to use sanctions to enforce a decision of the International Court of Justice, but the Security Council typically takes action independently of judicial decisions. 28 The authors of GATT recognized the potential conflict between U.N.-directed trade sanctions and GATT rules, and therefore provided a GATT exception for trade measures taken in pursuance of obligations under the U.N. Charter for the maintenance of peace and security. 29 Thus, the recent U.N. trade sanctions imposed on Sierra Leone 30 regarding "conflict diamonds" do not violate the WTO.
The GATT System
Because the drafters of the Charter for the International Trade Organization (ITO) included an entire chapter on the "Settlement of Differences," the dispute settlement provisions in the GATT are bare bones. 31 The remedies in the GATT and the (defunct) ITO Charter were similar however. In the GATT, the Contracting Parties may authorize a complaining country to suspend the application of such concessions or other obligations as the Contracting Parties determine to be appropriate. 32 In the ITO Charter, the Conference had the authority to release an injured country from obligations (or previously granted concessions) to any other country "to the extent and upon such conditions as it considers appropriate and compensatory, having regard to the benefit which has been nullified or impaired." 33 One difference in the treaties is that the ITO provision specifies an action that is "appropriate and compensatory," while the GATT uses the term "appropriate," but not the term "compensatory." Neither the GATT nor the ITO Charter employed the terms "retaliation" or "sanction."
In his study of the GATT and ITO preparatory work, John Jackson concludes that "it was clear that the draftsmen had in mind that [GATT] Article XXIII would play an important role in obtaining compliance with the GATT obligations." 34 He also notes that there were differing views on how far Article XXIII should gothat is, whether the suspension provision should be limited to the equivalence of the damage done, or should authorize action in the nature of a sanction. Some countries, such as the Arab League, opposed recourse to sanctions. 35 In his study of the ITO preparatory work, Robert Hudec explains that the issue of compensation versus sanctions proved to be controversial, and so was sent to a working party.
The working party agreed that even in the case of a legal violation, the remedy should be compensatory and no more. 36 Yet as Hudec points out, the working party's language was not included in the ITO or its Annex. In Hudec's view, the drafters did not want to say that the offending country owed no more than compensation because that would have suggested that the ITO obligations were merely a duty to pay for damage done, rather than a duty to adhere to the rules.
Clair Wilcox, a leading U.S. drafter, wrote a book about the ITO Charter in 1949, and his discussion of dispute resolution illuminates the dualistic role of these provisions. Wilcox explains that releasing the complaining government from its obligations is regarded "as a method of restoring a balance of benefits and obligations … . It is nowhere described as a penalty to be imposed on members who may violate their obligations or as a sanction to insure that these obligations will be observed." 37 But Wilcox does not stop there. He goes on to predict: "But even though it is not so regarded, it will operate in fact as a sanction and a penalty." 38 The historical record is unclear as to when the term "retaliation" began to be widely used to describe a GATT Article XXIII action. 39 The repeated use of that term in Kenneth Dam's book (on the GATT) in 1970 may have popularized "retaliation" as a GATT principle. 40 Dam explained that the act of retaliation constitutes "the heart of the GATT enforcement system." 41 The term "retaliation" connotes more belligerence than a rebalancing of negotiated concessions.
The term "sanction" was occasionally used by GATT experts. For example, a Secretariat Note in 1965 characterized withdrawing concessions under Article XXIII as "the final sanction." 42 In 1969, John Jackson described Article XXIII as a "sanctioning procedure." 43 In 1975, Eric Wyndham-White wrote that "The contractual nature of GATT determines the nature of its provisions for enforcement and sanctions." 44 In 1984, Guy de Lacharrière wrote that the GATT had once permitted The Netherlands to impose a "sanction" on the United States. 45 But generally "GATTologists" avoided using that term. 46 The author can remember being taught in the early 1980s that GATT Article XXIII was to be distinguished from a trade sanction.
The standard portrayal of this Article was a rebalancing of concessions.
One reason why the rebalancing paradigm lasted so long was that no GATT-authorized trade action ever occurred. The Contracting Parties authorized an Article XXIII suspension only once back in 1952, and The Netherlands did not impose the authorized quota. 47 So Wilcox's prediction never had the opportunity to ripen. 48 The WTO System
The GATT dispute settlement system was completely renovated in the WTO. Defendant governments lost their power to block the formation of dispute panels and to block the adoption of panel reports. The establishment of the Appellate Body made the system more judicial and authoritative. At Marrakesh, the trade ministers commended themselves for "the stronger and clearer legal framework they have adopted for the conduct of world trade, including a more effective and reliable dispute settlement mechanism." 49 The political flexibility inherent in the GATT was eliminated in the WTO. 50 The GATT said that the Contracting Parties "may" authorize suspension of concessions if the circumstances are "serious" enough and as they determine to be "appropriate." 51 In the Brazil Aircraft subsidy dispute, the arbitrators declared that an appropriate countermeasure "effectively induces compliance." 59 Furthermore, the arbitrators determined that SCM countermeasures need not be based on the level of "nullification or impairment." 60 In other words, the arbitrators rejected rebalancing as the basis for setting the level of the countermeasure.
Instead, they permitted retaliation equal to the size of the subsidy. These obligations have been spelled out through a series of important decisions by the Appellate Body. 62 Because the law itself is so ambiguous, it is hard to view interpreting and enforcing that law merely as maintaining a delicate balance of concessions or restoring the expected value of the Uruguay Round contract.
Another problem with the old rebalancing idea is that in the two retaliations so far, the U.S.
government did not technically suspend concessions. The U.S. retaliation imposed 100 percent tariffs (intended to be prohibitive) on an array of goods. Yet none of the tariffs on these goods in 1947 even approached 100 percent, and so the U.S. countermeasures were not technically a suspension of a GATT concession. 63 So the U.S. action looks much more like a sanction than a withdrawal of trade concessions to EC countries.
The Article 22.6 arbitrators have not considered whether the 100 percent tariffs could qualify as a suspension of a concession. 64 Of course, DSU Article 22.6 also permits the suspension of "other obligations," and so arbitrators could justify the U.S. countermeasures as a suspension of GATT Articles I and II. But suspending fundamental GATT rules misfits the rebalancing paradigm.
In contemporary discourse about WTO dispute settlement, analysts commonly refer to DSU Article 22 measures as a "sanction." Consider several examples from points along the trade policy spectrum:
The much more stringent dispute settlement procedure of the WTO ensures compliance --that is, withdrawal of the measure --in the case of a positive finding, or sanctions for noncompliance …. If the defendant member refuses to either change its out-of-conformity law or offer acceptable compensation, then under WTO rules the plaintiff member can impose trade sanctions against the offending member. Cato Institute, 2000. 71 The WTO is unique in combining a set of binding rules with a powerful mechanism for dispute settlement and the possibility of imposing economic sanctions to enforce compliance.
International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2000. 72 We have a dispute settlement system which provides for sanctions in the case of noncompliance. Of course, if the U.S. complies at the end of the day [on FSC] there will be no sanctions, but if they don't comply there will be sanctions. It's as simple as that. Pascal Lamy, 2000.
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Perhaps all these officials and commentators get it wrong. But I submit that this ordinary usage reflects the reality of the law in DSU Article 22.
Recently in the Bananas Retaliation case, the WTO panel actually used the term "sanction," calling it "the ultimate remedy under WTO law." 74 The term sanction is also used on the WTO website which explains that the DSB may give permission for "limited trade sanctions …." 75 After the DSB gave Canada permission to retaliate against Brazil, the WTO website announced that the DSB "had agreed to let Canada impose trade sanctions …." 76 Many governments and commentators view the possibility of sanctions as a positive feature of the WTO in making its rules "enforceable." 77 With a robust dispute settlement system and potential recourse to sanctions, the WTO is portrayed as an exceptional international organization that comes closer than most to propounding real law. Whatever the truth to that observation, it seems likely that Uruguay Round negotiators were able to obtain deeper governmental commitments than they would have without the many improvements in the GATT dispute system, such as the automatic approval of DSU Article 22 retaliation.
Let me recap the discussion so far: My thesis is that although the instrument of suspending "concessions or other obligations" remains constant from the GATT to the WTO, the dualistic quality of this act has shifted. In the GATT, Article XXIII trade measures were conceived primarily as rebalancing (although analysts recognized the sanction potential). In the WTO, the trade measure is conceived primarily as a sanction, while the rebalancing idea retains vestigial influence.
As economists have long observed, a single instrument cannot serve two distinct purposes.
Thus, one would not expect WTO-sponsored trade measures to serve equally well the purposes of rebalancing and inducing compliance. Because the DSU prescribes retaliation at a dose equal to "nullification or impairment," that will limit its effectiveness at inducing compliance. 78 So the trading system has embraced the idea of a compliance sanction even though it lacks authority to authorize actions tough enough to compel.
The mismatch between instrument and purpose gets even more complex in considering two other possible goals for DSU Article 22 trade measures. 79 One is "compensation" in the contractlaw-sense of recompensing damages in order to make the injured party whole. If that is the yardstick for Article 22 measures, then they are inadequate because they do not make the defendant liable for full restitution. The other possible purpose is to deter WTO violations.
Because they are limited to offsetting the "nullification or impairment," Article 22 trade measures will be inadequate to deter misbehavior. Thus, when governments regularly obey international trade rules, fear of Article 22 sanctions is not a big explanatory factor. As Robert Hudec has pointed out, "Ultimately, GATT law works because governments want it to work, not because they are bullied into compliance by trade sanctions." 80 In summary, although the form of countermeasures remained substantially the same in the GATT and the WTO, the purpose behind the measures changed. Wilcox's prediction that rebalancing measures would be perceived as sanctions is on the mark 50 years later. Ironically, the WTO has now achieved a sanction-based dispute settlement system similar to the one intended for the ILO in 1919, but never embraced because of its poor fit to the ILO's mission. Part II of this article will consider the question of whether trade sanctions are a good fit for the WTO's mission.
The most remarkable feature of the transformation from GATT retaliation to WTO sanction is that at no point did governments make an explicit choice to move from one principle to the other. It just happened through the application of WTO law. Although some governments and commentators may deny that any change has occurred, the evidence seems compelling that it has.
We should draw conclusions from that evidence. As Hans J. Morgenthau once explained, a "science" of international law must be able to revise "the traditional pattern of assumptions, concepts and devices" by looking at "the rules of international law as they are actually applied."
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II. Assessing WTO Trade
Part II provides a preliminary assessment of the use of trade sanctions in the WTO. Section
A considers the advantages of trade sanctions. Section B considers the disadvantages. Section C summarizes. In this article, no attempt is made to quantify any of these points so that they can be objectively weighed against each other.
A. Advantages of WTO Sanctions
This section will list seven distinct advantages in making trade sanctions available to the plaintiff government when a defendant government fails to comply with a DSB recommendation.
Advantages 1-3 and 7 are to the parties to the dispute. Advantages 4-7 are to the WTO membership as a whole. Note that Advantages 1-5 occur regardless of whether the trade action is perceived as rebalancing or as a sanction.
1. Venting and Closure for Plaintiff. Perhaps the most important purpose served by trade sanctions is that the plaintiff government can signal its outrage, placate the injured domestic constituency, and close the chapter so that it can move on. 82 In the Bananas and Hormones retaliations, the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) made clear to the European and American publics that it was taking strong action against the noncompliance. The USTR action gave the domestic industry some vindication. And the retaliation defused the issues to some extent.
The problem with this advantage is that the closed chapter is not staying closed. The EC gave no thought to counter-retaliation and so to that extent, the U.S. action could be the final step. But DSU Article 22.1 states that suspension is "temporary," and therefore the question of EC compliance will always be an issue for USTR. Moreover, as the enactment of the carousel shows, the affected domestic interests are not satisfied with the current level of retaliation. 83 So while venting and closure could be an advantage, the evidence suggests that it may only be a temporary one.
2. Gaiatsu for Defendant. Being retaliated against can also be useful for the defendant government by giving it leverage at home to change the law. The phenomenon of foreign pressure to promote internal change is often called "gaiatsu," the Japanese term for it. This hypothesis assumes that the government wants to comply with WTO rules but cannot because of domestic politics. The threat of sanctions changes the domestic political balance, however, by catalyzing the forces who would be hurt by the retaliation.
This would be a clever technique if it worked. It has not worked so far in Bananas or
Hormones. 84 Yet one can see evidence for it in a few cases such as U.S. Gasoline, Australia
Salmon, and Canada Periodicals, where the defendant governments were able to reverse discriminatory policies that had been promoted by special interests.
3. Usability of Sanctions. Probably the clearest advantage of a trade sanction is that it can be implemented by the plaintiff country once the DSB approves it. Unlike compensation which requires a bilateral agreement, the trade sanction is self-implementing in the sense that the plaintiff government can act alone. This may seem an obvious point, but it is a big advantage over alternative instruments. Because of its state-centric orientation, the WTO pays no attention to democratic processes in member countries. 85 Each government is obliged to comply with WTO rules, but no thought is given to whether its Congress or Parliament will approve such action. Thus, a dispute panel can recommend action to a defendant government that its lawmakers simply will not approve. Indeed, a panel can dictate action that would be a Constitutional violation for a government to perform. 86 Given this potential disconnect between WTO obligations and the political ability of democratic governments to comply with them, perhaps there should be space in the WTO for "political safeguards" in instances where disputed measures are backed by strong public support.
Hormones could be an example of this. 87 No one denies that the European Commission would have a difficult political chore in repealing that measure. But right now, the EC has no WTO-legal way to refuse meat produced with artificial hormones. Complying with DSB recommendations remains an obligation, even after being sanctioned. 88 5. WTO Supervises Unilateralism. In its role of authorizing sanctions, the WTO becomes the gatekeeper. The DSU requires that sanctions be approved (even if pro forma) by the DSB and provides an opportunity for the defendant government to seek arbitration of the amount of sanctions. 89 In all five instances in which Article 22 arbitrators have reviewed suspension requests, the panel cut back the retaliation proposed by the plaintiff government. 90 Because it is better that retaliatory actions be authorized than executed unilaterally, the supervision of sanctions in the DSU is a big advantage. 91 Although the U.S. Section 301 retaliation law was roundly criticized by many trade experts in the 1980s, Hudec took the more nuanced position that Section 301 was justified disobedience given the dysfunctions in GATT dispute settlement. 92 Hudec suggested that Section 301 could lead to systemic reforms, and indeed it did. The taming of USTR's aggressive unilateralism can be viewed as a positive development even if similar retaliation ensues. USTR had already retaliated against the EC on hormones in 1989, which USTR withdrew in 1996 at the outset of the WTO litigation. So in assessing the WTO Hormones retaliation, one should recall that baseline.
Another way of expressing this advantage is that the DSU meets the specifications of Section 301 which, one way or the other, will be carried out by the hegemonic United States. If the DSU were rewritten to eliminate the possibility of trade sanctions, then international trade law would no longer be consistent with U.S. domestic law, and so the United States would act outside WTO rules.
6. Sanctions Improve WTO Stature. Giving the WTO sanctioning authority improves its stature among international organizations and engenders respect for it. Had the teeth not been implanted, few would call the WTO the "powerful WTO" as it is routinely referred to today.
Furthermore, the availability of trade sanctions may be a key explanation for the high number of complaints that are being brought to the DSB. Several of the causes of action spring from longtime violations of GATT rules which did not change in the Uruguay Round.
The corollary to this point is that if somehow the trade sanctions were surgically extracted from the DSU, the WTO would lose stature. This suggests that if sanctions are to be eliminated, they must first be replaced with an alternative that maintains respect for the WTO. Some options for doing so will be discussed in Part III. A broader test is whether the threat of WTO sanctions promotes compliance so that the sanctions do not have to be imposed. In a few WTO cases, the threat of impending sanctions seems to have brought scofflaw governments into line. Such negative reinforcement occurred in the Australia Salmon and Leather disputes, where Australia took much of the action demanded by Canada and the United States. 93 The U.S. Foreign Sales Corporation case is another example. 94 The U.S. Congress passed a "clean" tax bill via a suspension of the rules in the House, unanimous consent in the Senate, and another suspension in the House. The final action occurred just a few days before the date that the EC had threatened to lodge its Article 22 request with the DSB.
Congress watchers agree that this unprecedented, streamline procedure for a tax bill would never have occurred without impending retaliation.
The mechanism by which the threat of sanctions induces compliance is not solely state-tostate. Rather, the sanctioning government (or sender) threatens private actors in the target country who then lobby their government to comply with the WTO recommendation. 95 As
Hudec explains, "Hopefully, the economic pain caused by the retaliation, threatened or actual, will enlist the support of the affected economic interests." 96 Political scientists will recognize this as a three-level game, as the sanctioning government interacts with domestic private actors, a foreign government, and foreign private actors.
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B. Disadvantages of WTO Sanctions
This section lists nine distinct disadvantages of WTO-authorized trade sanctions.
Disadvantages 1-3 are to the parties to the dispute. Disadvantages 1 and 4-9 are to the WTO membership. Note that Disadvantages 2-6 and 8 occur regardless of whether the trade action is perceived as rebalancing or a sanction.
1. Sanctions Don't Work. As noted above, sanctions failed in the two instances when they were used. But both cases are against an intractable target (the EC), and both cases involve difficult, non-trade issuesoverseas development in Bananas and health (or culture) in
Hormones. So those cases may be exceptional.
If sanctions do not work, the common response will be to change WTO rules to give them more bite. Instead of a 1:1 relationship between retaliation and "nullification or impairment," one could imagine a punitive sanction with a higher ratio. The U.S. Congressional carousel is one step toward making sanctions more costly. 98 The new legislation would rotate the carousel every six months. Another proposal is to multilateralize the sanction by allowing all WTO governments to impose Article 22 measures. In 1992, Kenneth Abbott recommended that the GATT consider a multilateral suspension of concessions, which he called a "true community sanction." 99 The idea of collective retaliation in the GATT goes back to 1965 when developing countries sought this remedy for violations by large countries. The industrial countries did not agree to this parity of pain, as Hudec explains, because they were comfortable with a legal system "where they can hurt the others but some of the others cannot really hurt them." It would be a good research topic for an economist. A large portion of the products included in each government's retaliation list were animal products, but it is unclear to what extent they match the companies that wanted to export hormone-grown meat to the EC. 102 The DSB has no requirement that the sanctioning government provide help to the complaining private economic actors. Indeed, the DSU completely ignores the complaining industry. One could imagine a requirement that any import duties collected in trade sanctions be paid to the complaining industry, but the DSU does not do that. In June 2000, Senator Max
Baucus introduced a bill to establish a Beef Industry Compensation Trust Fund that would channel the tariffs collected from U.S. retaliation in the Hormones dispute into "relief" for the U.S.
beef industry. 103 The bill was not enacted in 2000.
3. The Teeth Bite Back. Perhaps the biggest disadvantage of WTO sanctions is that they bite the country imposing the sanction. In the Bananas and Hormones cases, USTR imposed high tariffs on EC exports, which frustrates domestic users who suffer a loss of choice and probably have to pay higher prices for substitute products. Of course, many of these costs are simply transfers from domestic consumers to producers. But the sender country does entail some overall efficiency losses, and could end up getting hurt as much as the target country.
This inherent problem with trade retaliation has long been noted. Perhaps the earliest analyst was Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations who analyzed the utility of "retaliation" to open foreign markets. 104 Smith wrote that unilateral retaliation may be a good policy if it works to secure repeal of foreign barriers. But when "there is no probability that any such repeal can be procured, it seems a bad method of compensating the injury done to certain classes of our people, to do another injury ourselves, not only to those classes, but to almost all the other classes of them." 105 In his landmark tariff study of 1921, T.E.G. Gregory explained that a retaliatory trade war causes losses among both parties. 106 Commentators continue to point out the self-punishing nature of trade retaliation. 107 For example, in his discussion of GATT Article XXIII, Dam notes that "it often becomes painfully obvious that no one gains by retaliation …." 108 Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis rue that "A basic problem with [WTO] retaliation is that it involves raising barriers to trade, which is generally detrimental to the interests of the country that does so …." 109 This author is not aware of any study of the full domestic impact of the retaliatory tariffs imposed in Hormones and Bananas. 110 Such a study would have to look at the cost of securing replacements to the sanctioned products in the United States and at whether U.S. meat exports were successfully redirected to other countries. According to the U.S. Department of Commerce, the U.S. Government's retaliation committee "makes every effort to minimize the harmful effects on U.S. businesses and consumers." 111 That contention should be evaluated. 112 The suggestion that WTO sanctions are badly targeted is based on the assumption that the sanctions are intended to hurt foreigners, not domestic denizens. But there is another theory of sanctions which suggests that the way to induce others to act is not to punish them, but rather to Nevertheless, the WTO is out of step with the emerging idea that the State's right to engage in trade gains content only from the individuals encompassed in it. Consider, for example, the judgment of the WTO Section 301 panel which declared:
Trade is conducted most often and increasingly by private operators. It is through improved conditions for these private operators that Members benefit from WTO disciplines. The denial of benefits to a Member which flows from a breach is often indirect and results from the impact of the breach on the market place and the activities of individuals within it. In May 2000, the U.S. Congress instituted the so-called carousel provision which requires USTR to rotate the retaliation targets every six months. 123 In addition, the new law requires USTR to include "reciprocal goods of the industries affected" on the original and subsequent retaliation lists. 124 So far, USTR has refused to turn this carousel. If USTR does so, that may make future U.S.
sanctions more protectionist.
In some instances, retaliation will occur on products chosen by a government at the behest of lobbyists who recognize sanctions as an opportunity to secure import protection. This seems to have occurred with pork in the U.S. Hormones dispute. 125 Although the Clinton Administration was expected to announce new carousel sanctions in mid-June 2000, the decision was postponed to give USTR more time to evaluate over 400 suggestions from the private sector. 126 As it observes this process of special interest lobbying, the American public is unlikely to gain greater enthusiasm for U.S. trade policy. Indeed, the dangers of retaliation were noted by the Meltzer
Commission which said that
Retaliation is contrary to the spirit of the WTO. Sanctions increase restrictions on trade and create or expand groups interested in maintaining the restrictions. Domestic bargaining over who will benefit from protection weakens support for open trading arrangements.
The availability of trade sanctions may have other predictable, negative effects. For example, industries may look for WTO violations by foreign countries (not too hard to find) and encourage a government to file cases against deep-seated foreign laws for the express purpose of using retaliation to secure new protection. Another problem is that once sanctions are turned on, vested interests collecting rents may fight hard against removing sanctions even after the defendant government takes action to comply.
7. Sanctions Encourage Discrimination. An economic sanction is perforce discriminatory against the country being sanctioned. But it is one thing to sanction a scofflaw country in a blunt way, and another to single out particular companies or subnational governments. It is unclear whether the current U.S. retaliation is targeting companies. USTR is targeting specific EC countries, however, with the intent of influencing internal Community decisionmaking. 128 In Hormones, USTR varied the countries for several items on the hit list; none of the sanctions is EC-wide. 129 This sort of discrimination contradicts the most-favored-nation principle. But the DSU does not demand that sanction targets be selected in the least-GATTinconsistent manner. 130 8. Unequal Opportunities. The sanctioning power tends to favor larger economies over smaller ones. 131 This is a disadvantage for the small countries and the WTO system. To the extent that small countries are more trade-dependent than large countries, sanctions will hurt the small country more. As a victorious plaintiff, a smaller country would not be able to inflict much harm upon a larger country.
9. WTO Sets Bad Example. For a trade organization to employ trade sanctions sets a bad example for other international organizations. The WTO example is not followed literally; as noted above, no other organization would contravene its own norms the way that the WTO does.
But other organizations might want to utilize trade sanctions as an instrument for enforcing obligations.
If the WTO employs trade sanctions in dispute settlement, there is no principled reason why other international agencies should not do so too. 132 The unprincipled reason for having trade sanctions in the WTO, but not elsewhere, is that the WTO decides when trade sanctions can be used. From this perspective, WTO rules are constitutional in superintending the instruments that other treaties can use to achieve compliance.
This constitutional view of the WTO is objectionable for at least two reasons. First, the WTO is more of a club than an organization of global governance due to its difficult accession process. How could such a club purport to set parameters for U.N. treaties? Second, many world causes, like eliminating forced labor, would seem to provide better justifications for trade sanctions than maintaining commercial reciprocity.
Although some proposals have been made for legislating WTO-like trade sanctions in other regimes in order to strengthen compliance, most commentators have suggested the oppositebringing the rules of other regimes into the WTO for enforcement. 133 That is what happened with intellectual property in the Uruguay Round, and many civil society organizations have urged the same tack with environment and labor. 134 Such initiatives have resulted in a political challenge for the trading system, and were one factor in the failure at Seattle to launch a new WTO round. 135 Since the advent of the WTO, commentators have increasingly portrayed trade sanctions as a prerequisite for an enforceable treaty arrangement. So long as the WTO retains trade sanctions, they will be an allure to activists who want to use similar enforcement in other conventional international law. 136 These activists are not going to be swayed by the argument that trade sanctions can only be employed by the one organization where their use is self-contradictory.
C. Summary
A method for weighing the advantages and disadvantages against each other is not obvious. Some of the advantages and disadvantages are in direct tension --for example, Advantage 6 versus Disadvantages 4 and 9. Advantage 7 and Disadvantage 1 are also in tension.
In my view, the disadvantages of WTO trade sanctions outweigh the advantages.
Disadvantages 3-4, 6, and 9 are most salient. On the other side, Advantages 1, 3, and 5, have considerable merit. Moreover, the threat of sanctions does seem to promote compliance, although this effect could diminish if WTO sanctions came into regular use.
Five years from now, with more episodes to study, the overall picture may become clearer.
By then, we may learn whether sanctions are inducing compliance and whether the sanction procedure makes it harder to attain new WTO trade agreements. Even if trade sanctions are shown to be counterproductive, however, they will likely remain WTO policy until they can be replaced.
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III. Alternatives to WTO Trade Sanctions
The WTO needs a rule-based dispute resolution system. This is particularly useful for smaller countries who are disadvantaged in a system where disputes can only be resolved through bargaining and settlement. Furthermore, any dispute system needs a compliance review process.
The concern I am raising in this article is not about those features. It is only about the use of trade sanctions as a "last resort." Section D explores softer compliance approaches relying on transparency and oversight.
A. Models for Sanctions Other Than Trade
Excluding military measures, the U.N. found by a panel and the defendant government does not fully implement the agreed-upon action plan, the panel has the obligation of imposing a "monetary enforcement assessment" on the defendant government. 142 The panel would set the size of the assessment. 143 The assessment would then be paid to a tri-national fund to be used to improve enforcement in the defendant country. These pecuniary provisions have seen no use since the Agreement went into force in 1994.
2. Loss of Vote. The (Chicago) Convention on International Civil Aviation provides for dispute resolution by the ICAO Council established by the Convention. 144 An appeal is provided, and then the ensuing decision is final. 145 Any government found in default will have its voting power suspended in ICAO. Protocol for the Protection of the Ozone Layer. The Protocol has a process to judge non-compliance that can lead to a suspension of "rights and privileges," such as benefits from the financial mechanism. 148 As of 2000, several countries have been reviewed, but no privileges have yet been suspended. Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). 150 The WTO arbitrators noted that the suspension of obligations under the TRIPS Agreement interferes with private rights owned by natural or legal persons. 151 Nevertheless, the arbitrators pointed out that it was not within their mandate to consider whether they were giving Ecuador the go-ahead to violate intellectual property treaties. 152 Recently, Arvind Subramanian and Jayashree Watal advocated using TRIPS as a "retaliatory weapon." 153 The main difficulty these analysts see is that national laws protecting intellectual property may not be flexible enough to be suspended in a discriminatory way.
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Assessment. Of these alternatives, the imposition of monetary fines would be the most useful. A key advantage of a fine is that it properly targets the pain to the scofflaw country. The main disadvantage is that there is no way to compel payment. In 1915, F.N. Keen proposed that
States deposit a sum of money proportioned on population or financial resources that would be available to answer international obligations. 155 This did not happen, but is still a good idea.
Having the WTO disqualify a country from voting is not a good idea because the WTO at present does not conduct any voting. Yet withdrawing other membership rights may have possibilities. One key right that could be withdrawn from a scofflaw country is its right to invoke WTO dispute settlement. 156 This could perhaps be done under current DSU rules because the DSU is a "covered agreement" for purposes of authorizing retaliation. 157 Another option would be to disqualify any party in non-compliance from recommending any of its delegates to serve as chairperson of a WTO subsidiary organ. An advantage of such shaming sanctions is that they can be crafted to be irritating to the scofflaw party. 158 Having the WTO withdraw technical assistance is not a useful idea. The WTO does not deliver much technical assistance at present, and needs to do more. Moreover, in the two cases so far in which sanctions are being used, the scofflaw defendants are EC nations which do not need WTO technical assistance. Indeed, they are often the donor countries for WTO assistance programs.
In approving trade sanctions against intellectual property owners, the WTO negates its role 
B. Direct Effect of WTO Decisions
Although the WTO Agreement states that "Each Member shall ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures with its obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements," the WTO does not require governments to provide recourse to domestic courts so as to enforce WTO obligations. 159 At present, it appears that no WTO member government provides for such direct enforcement in its own courts. Indeed, in recent litigation, courts have suggested that there would be a disadvantage to a country having such enforcement when its trade partners do not. 160 Enforcing treaties or tribunal decisions in domestic courts is sometimes called giving them 
C. Trade Compensation
The DSU expresses a preference for compensation over suspension of concessions, but notes that compensation is voluntary. 166 Compensation in this context means action by the defendant government to reduce trade barriers. It does not refer to financial compensation (although that outcome is not precluded). 167 Compensation in the WTO would have to be given consistently with the most-favored-nation rule. 168 Thus, one "problem" with compensation is that in lowering tariffs to the plaintiff country, the defendant will also provide greater market access to third parties, and the sum total will likely be higher than the "nullification or impairment" to the plaintiff. Quotas are more usable for limiting compensation, but the WTO should not encourage more quotas.
Many trade law analysts favor compensation. Pauwelyn proposes that the DSU be changed to make compensation compulsory. 169 Horlick has improved the proposal by suggesting that the winning plaintiff be allowed to choose the products for compensation. 170 But no one has devised a solution for making the defendant comply. It takes two to compensate. As noted above, one of the virtues of WTO sanctions is that they can be implemented unilaterally.
D. Softer Compliance Approaches
In their study of compliance with international regulatory instruments, Abram and Antonia
Handler Chayes conclude that "Coercive sanctions are more infeasible for everyday treaty enforcement than as a response to crisis. Treaties with teeth are a will-o'-the-wisp." 171 Rather than sanctions, compliance is promoted through regime processes that utilize reporting, monitoring, capacity building, and persuasion. The authors also point to the potential usefulness of participation by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the compliance process. 172 It is noteworthy that the one early international organization, the ILO, that had recourse to trade sanctions in its Constitution made no use of them. Coercive sanctions were viewed as contradicting the basic norm of the Organization, which is that raising labor standards is in every country's own interest. 173 Instead, the ILO sought to induce domestic implementation of ILO conventions through independent review procedures and social dialogue. 174 The insight that compliance is promoted through softer approaches has been reached by analysts looking at many different regimes including, most notably, human rights and environment. 175 Rather than coercing governments, international treaty systems work by pulling governments into compliance through review processes and technical assistance. Behavior can be changed more easily by the power of persuasion than by the persuasion of power. As Richard N. Cooper advises: "If we want others to give the same weight to diverse human values as we do, we must persuade them, not coerce them, to shift the relative weights they choose." 176 Even without sanctions, the WTO would have better dispute settlement than most other treaties. Compare it to the multilateral environmental regime which generally lacks independent dispute settlement. 177 For example, the International Whaling Commission has no way to investigate whether Japan's recent expansion of "scientific" whaling is legitimate or just junk science. 178 The new International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea is an important development in favor of judicialization.
The DSU rules are sophisticated and engage the defendant government in a compliance process. The DSB retains jurisdiction until the issue is resolved, and after six months, the issue of implementation goes on the agenda for each DSB meeting. 179 In addition, the defendant government must provide a written status report before each meeting. Unfortunately, the DSB meetings are not open to the public so many of the potential benefits of this surveillance are lost.
It is possible that greater transparency of the WTO's factfinding and judgments might catalyze public opinion in the countries under review. At present, the typical WTO panel report is dry, abstruse, and lengthy, as perhaps befits an international law judgment. But one could imagine each panel preparing a digestible version for the public. For example in Hormones, the panel could have given Eurocitizens a clear explanation for why the hormone ban failed to meet international rules.
IV. Recommendations and Conclusion
The DSU affirms that "full implementation of a [DSB] recommendation to bring a measure into conformity with the covered agreements" is preferred over compensation or suspension of concessions. 180 But the DSU does not do enough to secure such implementation. International norms will be adhered to when they get domesticated into national law.
New modalities are needed to promote compliance in national decisionmaking processes when legislative changes are required. One possibility would be to establish a DSU Optional
Protocol whereby a WTO member government could sign on to the following procedure:
1. In any WTO dispute settlement, panels would be requested to use their authority to "suggest ways in which the Member concerned could implement the recommendations." 3. Governments would enact a fast-track procedure to provide for a legislative vote on the recommendation of the Body within four months. 183 The national Parliament or Congress would be free to reject the recommendation, and if that occurs, the issue would be returned to the WTO for Article 22 sanction procedures. Of course, the defendant government could always use its normal legislative procedures to achieve compliance. 
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While this Optional Protocol certainly does not assure a WTO-consistent outcome, it has the potential of making it easier for a defendant country to comply. The Optional Protocol seeks to influence the defendant government's decisionmaking from within, rather than to change it only from without by external economic pressure. In establishing a Domestic Body, a government makes an institution responsible for transforming a DSU decision into proposed legislative language. By receiving specific suggestions from the WTO panel, the Domestic Body will start with an option on the table. By giving private economic actors (e.g., consumer NGOs) the right to make statements, the body will seek to enhance public discourse about the dispute. By providing fast-track consideration, endless delays are headed off. By underlining the fundamental role of the national legislature, the Protocol avoids the politically treacherous approach of domestic judicial enforcement of WTO decisions.
It is true that the Optional Protocol might delay the authorization of sanctions by a few months. But if the Protocol works, it will render sanctions unnecessary. That trade-off should be worth it. To be sure, some governments might frustrate the object of this Protocol by composing the Domestic Body with individuals who will resist serious efforts at compliance. Nevertheless, a well-intentioned government that wants to comply, yet faces objections from strong domestic interests, might find the Optional Protocol useful. A group of such governments might join together to put the Protocol into force.
Professor Hudec has taught us that "The process of creating any legal system, where none existed before, can only come about slowly and incrementally. The ideas and institutions that make a legal system 'effective' have to grind themselves into the political attitudes of the societyhere, the society of governmentsover time." 186 By contrasting WTO-sponsored sanctions with softer compliance measures, this article shows the need to grind new attitudes into the WTO. Similarly, in recommending a new domestic procedure that would be interpenetrated by a WTO panel report, this article offers a proposal for reinforcing attitudes within countries toward achieving compliance. If sound replacements to trade sanctions can be found, the WTO will improve itself by pulling out its teeth.
